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This paper tests the efficiency of capital marketc; when information is costly to 
obtain by analysing the performance of Australian wholesale superannuation funds 
specialising in the management of domestic equity portfolios from 1991 through 
1999. Using a fund regression approach, the paper fmds evidence that is consistent 
with an incomplete arbitrage function, with investment managers generating 
returns sufficiently high to compensate them for the increased costs of active asset 
selection. Risk-adjusted returns in the Australian superannuation fund industry, net 
of management fees and expenses, are comparable to the returns from a passive 
asset selection policy. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For the past two decades the following question has been a source of continuing 
controversy for financial economists: Can the trades of informed investors occur at 
prices sufficiently different from full information prices to compensate !hem for the 
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cost of becoming informed? Answers to this question have been provided on the 
one hand by the received statement of market efficiency, the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH), and on the other hand by the incomplete arbitrage hypothesis 
(IAH). 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss in more detail the IAH in light of the 
EMH, with a view to testing the empirical validity of the IAH. Specifically, the 
paper considers the IAH notion that, in an efficient market where information is 
costly to obtain, investment managers should make trades and hold portfolios that 
earn risk-adjusted returns sufficiently higher than index funds to compensate them· 
for higher expenses. Using a four-factor model developed for the Australian 
setting, estimated risk-adjusted returns for a sample of Australian wholesale 
superannuation funds forthe period 1991 through 1999, are greaterthan zero. The 
results are consistent with the IAH model of equilibrium that incorporates the 
expenses of research and trading in the investment management process. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section I presents a theoretical conception 
of efficient capital markets under cost less and costly information, with a review of 
the implications of the empirical evidence to date for the competing hypotheses. 
Section II explores the applicability of the debate for Australia's national system 
of mandated retirement funding through the employment sector, termed 
superannuation. Section III presents the methodology to examine the efficiency 
with which investment managers convert retirement savings into retirement income 
in Australia through portfolios of domestic equities, with Section IV describing the 
sample. The empirical results are set forth in Section V. Section VI concludes the 
paper. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Under the assumption of costless information and trading in frictionless markets, 
Fama (1970) suggests that the arbitrage function in capital markets is complete, 
with security prices reflecting all available information. In such a market, any 
expenditure additional to the implementation of a passive asset selection policy is 
sunk. The EMH resolves the question of whether the trades of informed investors 
occur at prices sufficiently different from full information in the negative. The 
unpredictable nature of security prices removes the opportunity for managers to 
earn economic rents (including sufficient rents to compensate them for their 
information gathering costs) over the long run. 
The rudiments of the competing hypothesis, the IAH, are attributed to Grossman 
(1976). Grossman (1976) shows that in a market where the price system is noisy, 
markets do not aggregate information perfectly. Moreover, an efficient price 
system, chararcterised by perfect aggregation of information, eliminates the private 
incentive for collecting information. The central breakthrough in the development 
of the IAH was achieved when the assumption of costless information was relaxed. 
In a market characterised by costly information, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
argue that the EMH notion that all markets, including the market for information, 
are always in equilibrium and always perfectly arbitraged are inconsistent when the 
arbitrage fun~tion is costly. 
Economic Analysis & Policy Vol.32 No.I, March 2002 37 
The IAH answers the question of whether the trades of informed investors 
occur at prices sufficiently different from full information in the affirmative. In a 
market characterised by costly information, prices cannot perfectly reflect all 
available information. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) deduct that there is a 
fundamental conflict between the efficiency with which markets spread information 
and the incentive to acquire information. The IAH is controversial as it proposes an 
equilibrium in which there is a degree of disequilibrium. Underthe IAH framework, 
prices reflect the information of informed investors, or arbitragers, but only 
partially, such that those agents who expend resources to obtain information 
receive compensation. Alternatively, Lo (1997) suggests that it is the degree of 
market inefficiency that determines the effort investors are willing to expend to 
gather and trade on information. Therefore, a non-degenerative market equilibrium 
will only arise when there are sufficient profit opportunities to compensate for the 
cost of trading and information gathering. 
In formulating a model of the IAH for empirical refutation, Ippolito ( 1989) 
conceptualises a market in which passive asset selectors essentially pay informed 
active asset selector (through trades favouring informed investors) a sufficient 
amount to pay for the information-gathering activity. Informed investors out-
perform the market before expenses, but make no excess returns after netting out 
the expense of gathering information. Thus, in equilibrium, the IAH suggests that 
there is no incentive to favour investment managers with either a passive or active 
asset selection mandate. · 
In examining the performance of 143 US mutual funds over the twenty year 
period 1965 through 1984, Ippolito ( 1989) reports that the estimated single-index 
risk-adjusted return (a) of the mutual fund industry exceeded zero after deducting 
transaction· costs and expenses. The conclusions oflppolito ( 1989) were in contrast 
to those reached by the previous contributions of Jensen (1968), Sharpe (1964) and 
Treynor (1965). The results were particularly contentious in light of Jensen's 
(1968) contribution. Investigating a similar sample and methodology to Ippolito 
(1989) over the twenty year period previous, 1945 through 1964, Jensen (1968) 
estimates a negative r for the mutual fund industry. This led Jensen ( 1968) to deduct 
that, on average, investment managers could not earn rates of return that justified 
the expenses of operating the fund, a finding consistent with the EMH.Ippolito's 
( 1989) contribution was controversial as it demonstrated that sufficient profit 
opportunities existed in capital markets to compensate informed investors for the 
cost of trading and information gathering. Moreover, Ippolito ( 1989) provided, for 
the first time, empirical evidence that mutual funds with higher turnover, fees and 
expenses earned rates of return sufficiently high to offset the higher charges of 
active management, lending support to the IAH. 
The work of Ippolito ( 1989) ignited a number of responses from the academy. 
The leading advance on Ippolito's ( 1989) research was made by Elton, Gruber, Das 
and Hlavka (1993). Using an identical data set, Elton eta/. (1993) show that 
Ippolito's (1989) results were primarily due to the difference in the performance of 
equities outside the single-index (S&P SOO) in the period 1965 through 1984, 
compared to the performance of these assets in Jensen's period 1945 through 1964. 
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Furthermore, after accounting for mutual funds holding assets outside the single-
index (non-S&P 500 equities), Elton eta/. (1993) find that the Ippolito's (1989) 
results change and are identical to those found in earlier studies. 
The empirical evidence following the contribution of Elton eta/. (1996) has 
overwhelmingly corroborated the EMH notion that the trades of informed investors 
do not occur at prices sufficiently different from full information prices due to the 
completeness of the arbitrage function. Specifically, Cai, Chen and Yamada 
(1997), Coggin, Fabozzi and Rahman (1993), Edelen (1999), Gruber (1996), 
Malkiel (1995) and Zheng ( 1999) report that investment managers, on average, 
deliver inferior risk-adjusted results to a passive asset selection strategy. Brown and 
Goetzmann (1995), Carhart (1997) and Wermers (2000) provide only limited 
support for the IAH, finding that a value-weighted index of funds has a small 
positive risk-adjusted return compared to benchmark. 
Recent research considering this issue 'by Drew and Noland (2000), Drew and 
Stanford (200 I a, 200 I b, 2003), Sawicki (2000) and Sawicki and Ong (2000) for the 
Australian setting provides corroborating evidence of the experience in the United 
States. Using techniques comparable to Gruber (1996), Drew and Stanford (2003) 
find that the average domestic equity superannuation retail fund under-performs 
benchmark returns by a range of 46 to 93 basis points per annum for the period 1991 
through 1999. Drew and Stanford (2003) find that as an industry, investment 
managers destroy value for retail superannuation members, with the costs of 
research and trading associated with active management being largely sunk. 1 
3. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
The debate surrounding the completeness, or otherwise of the arbitrage function in 
capital markets is of particular relevance to Australia, in particular, financial 
intermediaries managing Australia's burgeoning pool of superannuation assets. 
Superannuation is the Commonwealth Government of Australia's preferred system 
for the provision of retirement income. The key characteristic that differentiates the 
evolution of superannuation funds from, say, US pension funding, is that the 
Australian systems is characterised by uniformity, with involuntary participation 
by employees, employers and government. 
In the 1991 Commonwealth budget, the Government announced its intention 
to introduce a Superannuation Guarantee Levy (SGL) that required all employers 
to provide a prescribed level of superannuation support to virtually all of their 
employees. On I July 1992, the SGL commenced at 4 per cent of annual national 
payroll for companies, scaling up to the 8 per cent of annual national payroll as at 
I July 2000. 
Retail funds are superannuation products that typically have a minimum initial investment 
amount of AUD 2,000 and subsequent minimum contributions of AUD I 00. Individual-
investors commonly use retail funds with superannuation assets of less than AUD 
100,000 to be invested per fund. 
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The introduction of the SGL on I July 1992 has seen Australia's superannuation 
assets more than double over the ensuing seven years. The Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (APRA) (1999) reports that superannuation assets at the end 
ofJune 1999totalled AUD409 billion or 58 percent of Australia's Gross Domestic 
Product. The mandated funding of retirement income through the employment 
sector has resulted in coverage for Australians. APRA ( 1999) find that 81 per cent 
of all employees in Australia are covered by superannuation, with coverage for full-
time employees higher at 97 per cent. 
The institutional setting for retirement funding arrangements in Australia 
provides a unique sample to test the international findings regarding the completeness. 
or otherwise, of the arbitrage function in capital markets. Moreover, it is timely to 
undertake an empirical evaluation of the performance of investment managers 
specialising in wholesale superannuation assets since the introduction of the SGL, 
to provide positive insights into the efficiency with which such managers are 
transforming retirement savings into retirement income. 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The method used to estimate risk-adjusted returns for the wholesale portfolios is 
comparable to Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999), which select factors for the 
multifactor model that span the major types of securities held by non-specialised 
equity portfolios. Specifically, this study uses the Fama and French (1992, 1993, 
1996) three-factor time series regression with an additional explanatory variable to 
account for holding in domestic fixed interest securities. Under this approach, OLS 
regressions are performed to estimate portfolio factor loadings and conditional 
(weighted average) and unconditional (arithmetic average) I measures from the . 
following regression: 
R;,- Rft = ai +f3m,(R,,-Rft) +{J.,;(R." -R,,) +{J_.;(R, -R.,) +fJJ;(R\Rft) +!{ (I) 
where: 
a = risk-adjusted excess return on fundi measured from (I); 
Rft = yield on the Reserve Bank of Australia 13-week treasury note in month 
t; 
Rm, = return on the Australian Stock Exchange Top I 00 accumulation index 
in month t (market); 
R,- R,, = difference in return between a small capitalisation portfolio and a large 
capitalisation portfolio based on Australian Stock Exchange-Russell 
Company indices in month t (size); 
Rgr- Rrr = difference in return between a growth and a value portfolio based on 
Australian Stock Exchange-Russell Company indices in month t 
(style); 
Rdr- R1i = difference in return on a bond index that represents Commonwealth, 
semi-government and corporate bonds across all maturities, based on 
I 
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the Warburg Dillon Reed Composite Bond (All Maturities) 
accumulation index in month t (domestic fixed interest factor); 
f3ki = sensitivity of difference in return on fund ito portfolio k, where k can 
represent the market, size, style or domestic fixed interest factor.; and, 
£; = random error term in month t. 
The size and growth portfolios were constructed from Australian Stock 
Exchange-Russell Company indices as follows: 
(a) the small capitalisation portfolio is the average of the return on the Russell 
Small Value and Russell Small Growth indices; 
(b) the large capitalisation portfolio is the average return on the Russell Value 100 
and Russell Growth 100 indices; 
(c) the growth portfolio is the average of the Russell Small Growth and Russell 
Growth 100 indices; and, 
(d) the value portfolio is the average of the return on the Russell Small Value and 
Russell Value I 00 indices. 
5. DATA COLLECTION 
Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (Morningstar), a key independent measurement 
service in Australia, waS commissioned to provide monthly return observations 
(net of management fees, excluding entry and exit loads) for every wholesale 
superannuation fund classified as ·wholesale Pooled Superannuation Trust 
Australian Equity- General', from january 1991 through Aprill999. The sample 
of funds is complete in the sense that it contains all of the funds with no missing data 
and was maintained by the same independent data collection agency throughout the 
period. 
All funds that were in existence in Australia during the sample period are 
examined in the study with one exception. As a minimum of 30 months of return 
data was required to perform OLS estimation for each investment manager, those 
funds that did not have at least 30 months of data available were excluded from the 
sample. This resulted in a total of study resulting in 2 funds being excluded. After 
excluding funds with less n < 30, a total of 30 funds remained in the sample. 
The advantage of the sample investigated in this study is that the structure of 
the asset allocation is known. To be classified by Morningstar as a 'Wholesale 
Pooled Superannuation Trust Australian Equity- General' the fund must hold a 
minimum of 80 per cent of portfolio assets in general Australian equities, with a 
maximum of 20 per cent of portfolio assets in domestic fixed interest securities. 
Therefore, this study can select factors to adjust for risk that do not suffer from the 
defects of asset coverage. 
Wholesale funds provide structured investment management services for the 
trustees of corporate or employer superannuation funds on behalf of einployee 
members. This study considers a sector specific investment policy, Australian 
Equity - General, as distinct from multi-sector or balanced policies. The funds 
investigated in this study typically require a minimum investment of AUD 250,000, 
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with minimum monthly contributions of AUD 20,000. 
The sample contains 3 distinct cohorts within the classification: open-end, 
closed-end and non-surviving. The wholesale open-end cohort consists of 
superannuation funds that are structured to accept investments from trustees. These 
funds are pooled and invested by a fund manager in a portfolio of general Australian 
equities. Wholesale funds permit superannuation trustees to buy and sell at a unit 
price based on the appraised value of total assets. Investors can leave and enter at 
any time and assets may be continually added to the fund. A total of 26 open-end 
funds are investigated in this study. · 
Closed end retail funds no longer accept new investors or new investments 
from existing unitholders. These are usually difficult funds for investors to exit 
owing to a lack of liquidity in the fund's underlying investments. However, due to 
the fund being closed-end in nature, this allow the fund manager to be largely 
unaffected by the impact oflarge capital inflows and outflows from superannuation 
trustees. This provides the investment manager with a degree of certainty regarding 
the assets under management. The liquidity issues relating to exiting such funds 
have resulted in superannuation trustees being minimal users of these closed-end 
products. A total of2 wholesale closed-end funds are examined in this study. The 
wholesale non-surviving cohort is comprised of funds that were terminated during 
the sample period. The decision to finalise a fund is typically made by the 
investment manager. The inclusion of the retail non-surviving cohort is key to 
mitigating the methodological flaw of survivorship bias (Malkiel 1995). The 
Australian wholesale market is characterised by a low mortality rate, with only 2 
funds were terminated over the sample period. 
A final note of interest regarding the sample relates to the asset selection policy 
of each of the investment managers evaluated. All of the funds investigated have 
undertaken an active approach to asset selection. This implies that each of the 
investment managers are of the belief that, as a minimum, the arbitrage function in 
the Australian equities market is incomplete, providing sufficient opportunities for 
wholesale managers to earn sufficient risk-adjusted returns to cover the costs 
associated with active asset selection. If this IAH holds, the decision to engage an 
investment manager to undertake active asset selection is a rational, profit maximising 
strategy for the superannuation fund trustee2. 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Risk-unadjusted results 
Table I illustrates that the average returns of all 'Wholesale Pooled Superannuation 
Trust Australian Equity - General' funds during the observation period were 
1.1778 per cent per month or 14.13 per cent per annum on an unconditional basis. 
The unconditional results are comparable to a buy-and-hold return on the ASX Top 
100 accumulation index of 1.3156 percent pt;r month or 15.78 per cent per annum. 
The limitations of the risk-unadjusted technology are well documented. 
Tucker. Becker, lsimbabi and Ogden (1994) argue that the most egregious error 
committed during, any assessment of fund manager performance is conducting a 
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comparison of fund returns without consideration of differential fund risk levels. 
To adjust for risk, this study employs a fund regression approach using a multifactor 
model. 
TABLE 1 
RISK-UNADJUSTED RETURNS OF 
'Wholesale Pooled Superannuation Trust Australian Equity- General' 
Funds: January 1991 to April 1999 
The returns in the table are reported on a monthly basis. Unconditional returns are denoted as EW 
(equally weighted) being the simple arithmetic average of returns. Conditional returns are 
denoted as CW (conditionally weighted) with individual fund returns weighted by their 
respective assets under management to derive an average of returns. The buy-and-hold 100 (20) 
index is the monthly return recorded on the ASX Top 100 (20) accumulation index over the 
sample period. 
Cohort 
Open-end 
Closed--end 
Finalised 
All funds 
Buy-and-hold 100 
Buy-and-hold 20 
6.2 Risk-adjusted results 
EW Mean return 
1.1969 
0.9128 
0.9623 
1.1778 
1.3156 
1.3878 
CW Mean return 
0.0475 
0.0002 
0.0028 
0.0420. 
Table 2 reports the estimated on a conditional and unconditional basis using the · 
. fund regression approach. 
The equation in (I) was estimated for the 30 'Wholesale Pooled Superannuation 
Trust Australian Equity- General' funds, from January 1991 through April 1999. 
Following the contribution of Ippolito (1989), the central question asked of the 
sample is whether there is any evidence that investment managers either failed to 
earn rates of return available through passive asset selection (index fund) or earned 
returns that were superior to the market. 
Using the four-index model with Rm, equal to the ASX Top 100 accumulation 
index, the unconditional alpha for the industry was estimated at 0.0866 per cent per 
month, or I 03 basis points per annum. The more appropriate measure of industry 
performance, the conditional alpha, is weighted by mean asset size and was estimated 
at 0.0233 per cent per month, or 27 basis points per annum. The positive alpha is 
consistent across the open and closed-end cohort and corroborated using a different 
market proxy (with Rmt equal to the ASX Top 20 accumulation index, the unconditional 
alpha for the industry was 69 basis points per annum and the unconditional alpha at 
21 basis points per annum). As with the studies of Gruber (1996) and Drew and 
Stanford (2003), none of the intercept terms for the industry are statistically 
significant at the 5 or I 0 percent confidence interval. However, unlike these previous 
studies, the results provide the ftrst preliminary evidence of the funds management 
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industry earning sufficiently high risk-adjusted returns to compensate them for the 
cost of becoming informed using the multi-asset pricing technology. 
The results presented in Table 2 are consistent with the Grossman and Stiglitz 
( 1980) notion that if investment managers are essentially informed investors, then 
their returns, adjusted for risk and expenses will be comparable to the returns 
achieved in an index fund due to the cost of becoming informed. The evidence 
presented using a sample of Australian superannuation investment managers 
cannot reject the IAH model of equilibrium. With similar results, Ippolito (I 989) 
deducts that the evidence is consistent with the notion that that expenses and 
charges affiliated with investment management are offset by superior results, a 
condition which characterises efficient markets in the presence of costly information. 
Following the critique of Elton eta/ ...... (I 993), this study has addressed the major 
methodological flaws in previous studies, specifically relating to survivorship bias 
and the use of a multifactor conception of the CAPM. 
TABLE II 
RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS USING THE FUND REGRESSION 
APPROACH: JANUARY 1991 TO APRIL 1999 
Alpha () is estimated from the time series regression of the excess fund returns on the excess 
market return and the mimicking returns for the size (R.r1-R1,J, style (R~1 -R1•1 ) and bond (Rd1-Rf1) 
factors: R;1 -Rf1 =a;+ /3,111(Rn11 -Rp) + f3.tlR.,,-R,,) + f3.~;(R1l 1 -R1.,) + f3c~lRd1 -Rp) + Ei. The excess 
market return, Rmr -Rft. is the difference between the return on the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) Top 100 Accumulation Index (with the ASX Top 20 Accumulation index used as a 
confirmatory proxy) and the yield on the Reserve Bank of Australia 13-week treasury note in 
month t. The size factor is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the common size anomaly 
in stock returns. The style factor is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the common book-
to-market equity anomaly in stock returns. Finally, the bond factor is the return on the mimicking 
portfolio of domestic fixed interest securities to remove the defects of asset coverage. The 
market, size, style and bond factors are constructed following the descriptions of Fama and 
French (1993), Gruber (1996) and Drew and Stanford (2003). f3k is the factor loading on the 
corresponding independent variable. All t-statistics are provided in the brackets nnd are adjusted 
for autocorrelation using the Newey-West covariance matrix. Performance measures are in 
percentage return per month. The R2 for all funds on anEW (CW) basis was 0.8251 (0.8474) with 
a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.023 (2.006). Given no evidence of serial correlation, we do not 
pursue further into the first-order autoregressive AR I and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. 
Cohort EW Alpha (a4) 
Rmr = ASX Top 100 Accumulation Index 
Open-end 0.0998 (0.0051) 
Closed-end 0.0545 (0.0005) 
Finalised -0.0530 (0.0013) 
All funds 0.0866 (0.0045) 
R,, = ASX Top 20 Accumulation Index 
Open-end 0.0672 (0.0051) 
Closed-end 0.0353 (0.00051 
Finalised -0.0490 (0.0013) 
All funds 0.0573 (0.0036) 
CW Alpha (a4) 
0.0051 (0.0249) 
0.0013 (0.0062) 
-0.0005 (0.0051) 
0.0045 (0.0233) 
0.0041 (0.0051) 
-0.0007 (0.0005) 
0.0011 (0.0013) 
0.0036 (0.0045) 
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The empirical analysis undertaken in Table 2 provides partial answers to the 
question of whether investment managers generate sufficient returns to offset 
expenses. There is no evidence over the observation period that, net of management 
fees, investment managers underperformed a passive asset selection strategy on a 
risk-adjusted basis. A further issue that requires analysis relates to the role of fees. 
An important issue to consider is whether a direct relationship exists between the 
management fee charged by investment managers and the resultant performance. 
Specifically, the question asked of the sample is whether funds that charge higher 
management fees earn sufficiently higher rates of return to cover such costs. 
6.3 Management fees 
The ongoing management fees of the funds investigated in this study are charged 
based on the value of fund units. Typically, the management fee is accrued daily and 
is payable quarterly in arrears (or upon the full withdrawal of the fund) by the 
redemption of units. The unconditional management fee ofthe sample is 0.74 per 
cent per annum and 0.76 per cent per annum on a conditional basis. A further 
defining feature of the sample of wholesale funds is that no entry or exit loads are 
levied by any of the managers. To test for a relationship between the management 
fee and fund returns, Table 3 sorts fund alphas into management expense ratio 
(MER) bands on an equal- and conditional-weighted basis. 
TABLE3 
INVESTMENT MANAGER ALPHAS, SORTED BY MANAGEMENT 
FEE: JANUARY 1991 TO APRIL 1999 
The monthly fund alphas are sorted into annual management fee bands and reported on a equal 
and conditional weighted basis. In a typical fund, ongoing management fees are charged on a 
sliding scale based on the value of units. Fees are accrued daily and are payable quarterly in 
arrears (or upon full withdrawal from the fund) by the redemption of units. All costs incurred in 
managing the assets of the fund are charged to the fund and are taken into account when 
calculating unit values. These costs include stamp duty and other statutory charges, brokerage, 
commission, taxes, costs associated with valuations and costs on the acquisition and disposal of 
assets, fees associated with the management and maintenance of assets and custodial fees. 
Management Expense Ratio 
MER<0.6% 
0.6% >MER <0.7% 
0.7% >MER< 0.8% 
0.8% >MER< 0.9% 
0.9%>MER 
EW Mean return 
0.4957 
0.3645 
-0.0619 
0.1283 
0.1155 
CW Mean return 
0.2614 
0.2187 
-0.0467 
0.1182 
0.1032 
Table 3 provides evidence that suggests an inverse relationship exists between 
management fees and investment manager returns. Excluding the most populated 
band, 0.7% >MER< 0.8%, as it includes all the funds from the·finalised cohort, 
estimated investment manager returns decline with higher expenses. This finding 
is inconsistent with the IAH suggestion of a positive relationship between manager 
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returns and fees. Moreover, this finding aligns much more closely with the EMH 
notion that costs associated with research and trading are sunk. 
6.4 Policy implications 
The evidence presented in the analysis section raises a number of important 
nonnative issues for the trustees of superannuation funds. First, contrary to recent 
empirical studies, evidence is presented that the arbitrage function is incomplete, 
with the investment management industry covering expenses through active asset 
selection. This provides some support for trustees to engage wholesale managers 
with an active stock selection mandate on behalf of superannuation fund members. 
Second, again contrary to recent studies, the Australian 'Wholesale Pooled 
Superannuation Trust Australian Equity -General' fund segment has a remarkably 
low attrition rate. Low fund mortality minimises the risk that trustees will formulate 
overly optimistic future. return expectations. A question that needs to be addressed 
in future research is why the mortality rate in the wholesale segment is so low. One 
possible answer to this question is that. given the nature of Australian's 
superannuation arrangements. wholesale investment managers face a highly inelastic 
demand curve for their services. 
Finally, on the issue of manager remuneration, trustees must be cognisant of the 
inverse relationship between management fees and returns presented in this paper. 
This study finds that active investment managers that have higher expense ratios, 
higher fees and higher turnover do not earn sufficiently higher rates of return to pay 
for these additional costs. The evidence presented in Table 3 raises a number of 
interesting (and potentially profitable) issues for future research relating to the 
quantification of an equilibrium point between the marginal cost and marginal 
benefit of active asset selection. The identification of such a point would assist 
trustees in striking a remuneration level for investment managers that maximises 
the efficiency in which retirement savings are converted into retirement incomes. 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the performance ·of Australian 'Wholesale Pooled 
Superannuation Trust Australian Equity- General' funds for the period January 
1991 through April 1999. Evidence is provided that informed investors, in an 
efficient capital market with costly information, earn sufficient economic rents to 
compensate them for the cost of obtaining the information. Using a multifactor 
model on a sample free of survivorship bias, the study finds that the investment 
management industry earned a positive alpha using alternate market benchmarks, 
a finding consistent with the IAH. 
To investigate the controversial findings, the hypothesis was tested that 
investment managers that followed more active asset selection policies (as evinced 
by higher management expense ratios) generated sufficient economic rents to cover 
the higher expenses. Unlike the findings of Ippolito ( 1989), the results showed that 
an inverse relationship exists between management expenses and fund return, a 
finding consistent with the EMH. · 
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The results reported in this paper have raised two interesting directions for 
future research in investment manager evaluation. First, further investigation is 
required into the reasons behind the low fund attrition rate in Australian wholesale 
funds. Second, an extension of these results to attempt to quantify the relationship 
between the marginal benefit and marginal cost of active. asset selection is an 
immediate priority to assist the trustees of superannuation funds in the remuneration 
decision of investment managers. 
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